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The way forward for autonomous vehicle ethics does not
revolve around solving old moral dilemmas, but on
agreeing on new rules.
Contractarian ethical frameworks claim that the norms we
accept as good or proper are mere results of social compro-
mise that is ultimately driven by the self-interest of the
involved parties. This position is in contrast with other para-
digms around the foundations of ethics, for instance virtues
or divine commands. 
We are under no obligation to subscribe to one single, exclu-
sive ethical paradigm for all purposes and aspects of our
lives. One could apply a particular approach to autonomous
cars while allowing others in other domains as long as they
can be made compatible. 
We believe that a contractarian approach should be taken in
the context of autonomous cars, and also that if we are to
ever enjoy a serious diffusion of fully autonomous cars it will
happen based on the grounds of compromise - or it won’t
happen at all.  
From this it follows that the decisions required during
autonomous car development are to be found at the intersec-
tion of what is generally considered to constitute acceptable
vehicle behaviour as applies to all road users - if such an inter-
section exists at all. This means that the industry involved in
defining such behaviour should simply make proposals and
ask for a compromise rather than chasing for moral truths. 
The case of autonomous cars should be easier than other
social issues, too, because any person can conceivably take
on the identity of any type of road user in a particular situa-
tion. An individual may be a pedestrian in the morning, a
bicycle rider during the day and a passenger in the evening
e.g. in an autonomous cab. With other issues our identities
tend to be more entrenched.  
Let us take most basic autonomous vehicle related ethical
dilemma to illustrate the approach. The autonomous car finds
itself in an emergency situation in which it can either hit and
kill a group of pedestrians or swerve and sacrifice its passen-
gers [1]. There appears to be no other option. This thought
experiment has been advanced with a variety of discrimi-
nating factors like the number of casualties in
pedestrians/passengers, age, gender, various forms of social
role of the involved people, etc. 
The example reveals the very high dependence on both our
and the car’s epistemic facilities in evaluating such situations.
In reality the car cannot be certain what kind of objects it has
detected as the Arizona Uber incident in which a cyclist died
illustrated. Worse still, it has only a partial appraisal of the
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uncertainty of the object categorisation itself. Also, it has
been shown that the neural networks - the technology that
performs the identification - can be tricked [2] (the resilience
of neural networks to such attacks is a research subject at our
department). The uncertainty attached to such situations
means that the ethical dilemma itself is only known proba-
bilistically. 
At any rate, we are not expecting moral agency from the car
itself. Instead these decisions are supposed to be made
design-time. Here is where the fallacy of our epistemic facil-
ities come into play. When asked in an experiment a large
majority of subjects will say that the vehicle should sacrifice
one to save many. But such preventive action has the non-
trivial consequence that this known vehicle behaviour allows
for malicious actors to trick cars into killing people - by actu-
ally jumping in front of a car or even without if the object
detection can be tricked. Or, the pedestrian might jump away
but the vehicle happens to swerve in the same direction,
causing the very tragedy it tried to prevent. When presenting
such scenarios to subjects they often backtrack on their pre-
vious opinions. Nontrivial consequences are one reason why
surveys like the Moral Machine [3] are flawed.
Let us instead entertain a typically contractarian proposal:
the autonomous car shall brake intensely in such situations
but it will never swerve. This proposal has the marks of good
rule-based systems: it is both simple to implement and to
understand and results in predictable behaviour.
Such a proposal, as long as we think in the context of the cur-
rent traffic conditions, would result in tragic casualties in
some individual cases, which might have arguably been pre-
vented by a human driver. However, the simplicity of such a
self-preserving rule will allow those very conditions to be
changed so that the situation won’t arise.
The contractarian approach is rational because it does not
attempt to solve moral value dilemmas that have proven to be
intractable over the last couple of hundred years. It also
accounts for the unimaginability of future situations that is
the reality of design-time work. What it does instead is come
up with a simple set of rules design-time, asking for the con-
sent of all road users, and thereby in run-time it allows for
more control of the situations that impact humans by virtue
of being easily predictable. This also allows an evolution of
the overall attitude of human road users towards autonomous
vehicles in yet unforeseen ways to manage their presence in
their own self-interest.
Finally, in order for the contractarian approach to work it
needs to stick to its principles - beyond simplicity and intelli-
gibility, those behaviour patterns should be well-known or
even advertised; it should be accepted if not with full con-
sensus but at least with compromise; and these behaviour
patterns should be guaranteed to operate consistently as
much as possible. About a hundred years ago, when the auto-
mobile was a novelty, pedestrians needed to vacate some
parts of the streets in ways they were not required to in the
age of horse carriages - but in return they got traffic lights. At
a red light, drivers stop even if there is absolutely no traffic
for kilometres: the contract is binding and ensures safety by
not allowing any self-judged overruling.
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Figure1:Theepistemicconstraintsoftheautonomouscarlimitthescopeofdesign-timemoralinvestigations.
